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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Atlantic Limousine, a limousine service providing services 
primarily to hotels and casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
has petitioned this court for review of the Or der of the 
National Labor Relations Board awarding backpay in the 
amount of $22,507.74 plus interest to V ictor Jenkins, and 
$17,296.73 plus interest to Henry Purcell, both of whom 
were limousine drivers for Atlantic. The Boar d has cross- 
applied for enforcement of the same order . 
 
Specifically, Atlantic challenges the amount of tips the 
Board determined the two had earned, arguing that: (1) 
federal tax policy requires that the amount of tips Purcell 
and Jenkins declared on their income tax r eturns for those 
periods be dispositive on the issue of their past income; and 
(2) there was a lack of substantial evidence in support of 
the Board's backpay award. In addition, Atlantic contends 
that Jenkins failed to mitigate his damages because he was 
unavailable for work during the seven months between his 
termination and his reinstatement. Because we find both 
that the Board's reliance on the evidence adduced was 
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proper, and that there was substantial evidence to support 
the Board's findings regarding both backpay and 
mitigation, we will deny the petition for review and enforce 
the order of the Board. 
 
I. Procedural History 
 
On March 4, 1995, the Board found that Atlantic had 
engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of 29 U.S.C. 
158(a)(3) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act") 
by discharging four and suspending one of its employees 
for their union activities.1 Once the Board finds that an 
employer has committed an unfair labor practice, it has 
broad discretion under the Act to or der the wrongdoer "to 
take such affirmative action including r einstatement of 
employees with or without backpay, as will ef fectuate the 
policies of [the Act]." 29 U.S.C. S 160(c). The purpose of the 
backpay remedy is to "mak[e] the employees whole for 
losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice," 
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1953), by r estoring 
"the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would 
have [been] obtained but for the illegal discrimination." 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). 
 
On May 28, 1997, the Board filed a compliance 
specification outlining the amount of backpay that should 
be paid to the aggrieved employees under the Boar d's 
March 4, 1995 remedial order. Atlantic challenged the 
compliance specification, and a hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ upheld the 
backpay award, and the Board affir med its decision. We 
now review the Board's order. 
 
II. Background 
 
The standard formula the Board employs in arriving at a 
compliance specification is based on the ear nings of the 
claimant in a representative period prior to the backpay 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although the proceeding before the Board involved five claimants, after 
the Board's decision, the parties enter ed into negotiations and three of 
those employees settled. This appeal, therefor e, only addresses the 
backpay awards for Purcell and Jenkins. 
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period. The Board then applies the averages of those 
earnings to the backpay period. Atlantic does not challenge 
the formula used. Rather, it contends that the average 
weekly tip earnings used in the formula were incorrect 
because they exceeded the amounts reported on the 
employees' tax returns and were unsupported by the 
evidence. 
 
Atlantic's drivers can be tipped in a variety of ways. 
Certain corporate and business clients have a contractual 
relationship with Atlantic, and are billed for services with 
charges that include a preset gratuity for the driver, which 
is distributed in the next paycheck. These tips ar e referred 
to as "tips on the bill." The drivers can also receive tips in 
cash or they can be added to a payment by cr edit card. 
Because tips on the bill and credit car d tips are reflected in 
amounts transmitted directly to Atlantic, the only tip 
amounts disputed on appeal are the claimants' cash tips, 
since the drivers receive them directly fr om customers 
without receipts showing the amount given. 
 
Atlantic requires its drivers to submit weekly time sheets 
indicating the number of hours they worked and the 
specific runs they made. These sheets also have a space at 
the bottom for the drivers to record the amount of cash tips 
they received, though the General Manager for Atlantic, 
Leon Geiger, testified that most drivers do not provide any 
information regarding their cash tips on their time sheets. 
Atlantic processes the timesheets and generates weekly tip 
declarations reflecting credit car d tips, tips on the bill, and 
the cash tips reported on the time sheets. These tip 
declaration reports are then distributed to the drivers for 
their review and signature. The employees are instructed 
not to sign a tip declaration report if the tip amount 
indicated is incorrect. 
 
Jenkins and Purcell claimed that they ear ned more in 
tips than reported in payroll and tax documents. Jenkins 
testified that he earned approximately $450 per week in 
tips, while Purcell claimed to have ear ned anywhere from 
$300 to $480 per week. Both admitted they had not 
accurately reported these earnings to the Internal Revenue 
Service ("IRS"). Jenkins had reported annual tip income to 
the IRS that reflected an average of $158 per week during 
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this time, and Purcell, $115. Jenkins also testified that he 
would submit only the carbon copy of the time sheet to 
Atlantic, omitting his cash tips, but that he would record 
his cash tips on the original copy in a column listed as 
"Added Tips." He submitted the original copy of the time 
sheet for the last week he had worked for Atlantic in order 
to demonstrate this practice. This original copy r eflected 
cash tip earnings of $430 for that week. That document 
was the only one submitted by Jenkins in support of his 
claim of higher tip levels. Purcell did not pr ovide any 
documentation. 
 
Jenkins also testified regarding his search for interim 
employment. He indicated that he searched for employment 
during the seven months he was unemployed by applying 
to two limousine companies approximately two weeks after 
he was terminated, answering newspaper ads for jobs at 
three casinos, and sending out many resumes. During 
those seven months, he was caring for his mother , who was 
ill. He stated that because his mother was sick and he was 
her caretaker, he was only available for work in the evening 
hours, though he explained that his time restriction did not 
prevent him from being able to work full-time. He also 
emphasized that he searched for employment during the 
entire period in question. He posited that the reason he 
could not find another limousine job right away was 
because he was "blackballed." 
 
Seeking to counter the testimony of Jenkins and Pur cell, 
Atlantic provided payroll recor ds for 1992 and 1993 
reflecting credit card tips, tips on the bill, and any cash tips 
declared by employees to Atlantic. Atlantic ur ged that these 
records, along with the tax retur ns filed by Jenkins and 
Purcell, should form the basis for deter mining its backpay 
liability. 
 
On February 26, 1998, the ALJ issued its Supplemental 
Decision awarding Jenkins and Purcell $360 and $325 per 
week in backpay, respectively, which wer e the amounts set 
forth in the Board's compliance specification. First, the ALJ 
ruled that claimants may assert tip income that had not 
been reported in their tax returns. While the ALJ 
recognized that both claimants had failed to r eport all of 
their tip earnings to the IRS, he found that an admission of 
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underreporting tips to the IRS does not pr eclude such tips 
from being included in a backpay award. The ALJ also 
determined that "both the employees and the Respondent 
had offsetting interest [sic] in under reporting actual 
income." ALJ Dec. at 4. 
 
The ALJ stated its conclusion: "While the evidence is less 
than overwhelming, under these circumstances, I am not 
persuaded that the compliance figures for weekly tips of 
$360 for Jenkins and $325 for Purcell ar e unreasonable or 
inaccurate." Id. The ALJ further noted that "[t]he reported 
tips, relied upon by [Atlantic], clearly are not an accurate 
reflection of the actual tip income r eceived." Id. The ALJ 
also found the testimony of Jenkins and Purcell to be 
"believable." Id. Finally, the ALJ concluded that there was 
"a sound and reasonable basis for [awar ding] the figures set 
forth in the compliance specification," and that Atlantic had 
not offered convincing evidence that Jenkins and Purcell 
had earned less. Id. 
 
The ALJ next turned to the issue of the mitigation of 
damages, finding that Jenkins testified cr edibly that he 
began to search for work immediately after his termination. 
The ALJ found that despite the fact that Jenkins had no 
interim earnings, this lack of success did not indicate a 
"willful failure or an unreasonable search for employment." 
Id. In addition, the ALJ rejected Atlantic's contention that 
Jenkins was unavailable for work due to his need to care 
for his mother. 
 
On April 30, 1999, the Board issued its Supplemental 
Decision and Order affirming the ALJ's conclusion that "the 
gross backpay computations in the backpay specifications 
are the most accurate possible estimates of backpay and 
that [Atlantic] has failed to establish any r easonable 
alternative basis for a diminution of damages." Id. The 
Board agreed that "Victor Jenkins' lack of interim earnings 
for the backpay period of May 31, 1993, through January 
17, 1994, was not indicative of an unreasonable search for 
employment related to his care for his mother . . . . " Supp. 
Dec. at 1. It also held that the ALJ's analysis of the issue 
of whether or not to consider evidence of underr eported tips 
was in accord with Board precedent, and noted that the IRS 
would receive a copy of its decision. Id.  at 2. One member 
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of the three member panel dissented because he would not 
have allowed the discriminatees to claim income not 
reported to the IRS, and because he believed that Jenkins 
did not make an adequate search for employment during 
the time period in question. 
 
III. Discussion 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
S 160 (e) and (f). The Board's findings of fact in a backpay 
proceeding will be upheld unless the recor d, considered as 
a whole, shows no substantial evidence to support those 
findings. 88 Transit Lines, Inc. v. NLRB , 55 F.3d 823, 825 
(3d Cir. 1995). "While we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the Board, we may modify an or der to ensure 
that it effectuates the policies of the Act." Tubari Ltd., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir . 1992). With respect to 
legal questions, we exercise plenary review, although we 
give due deference to the Board's expertise in labor matters. 
88 Transit, 55 F.3d at 825. 
 
A. Backpay Determination 
 
Atlantic presented the Board with the income tax returns 
of Jenkins and Purcell, and urged that itfind those records 
to be conclusive as to the amount of tips ear ned by each of 
them, because to not do so would be to ignor e federal tax 
policy. The Board rejected this reasoning, and on appeal, 
Atlantic argues that this decision is err oneous. To support 
its argument, Atlantic relies on two Supr eme Court cases, 
our precedent, and its view of the policy implications of the 
Board's ruling.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. By asserting that the discriminatees' testimony should have been 
rejected because their testimony was inconsistent with their sworn tax 
returns, Atlantic may also be claiming, but has never explicitly urged, 
that the discriminatees should be "estopped" from asserting higher 
income, having earlier misreported their true income. While a policy of 
judicial estoppel has evolved that can apply in the event a litigant seeks 
to assert a position inconsistent with one made in connection with a 
previous judicial proceeding, e.g., In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 
214, 229 (3d Cir. 1998), we know of no basis for crafting a theory of 
estoppel based upon sworn statements in a tax return and will not 
explore such a theory sua sponte. 
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First, Atlantic points to Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 
316 U.S. 31 (1942). There, employees engaged in a strike in 
response to the shipowner's unfair labor practices, and the 
shipowner terminated five of the strikers. Id. at 34-35. The 
Board ordered the shipowner to r einstate the five men with 
backpay. Id. at 36. The Supreme Court, however, 
determined that under maritime law, the type of striking 
conduct in which they engaged was illegal,3 and it reversed 
the order of reinstatement. Id. at 40, 48. 
 
The Supreme Court expressed the need to limit the 
Board's discretion in enforcing the policies of the Act when 
the Board's remedial action contravened important 
Congressional policy. Id. at 46. In r eaching its conclusion 
that the claimants' violation of the maritime laws precluded 
the relief they sought under the Act, the Court made the 
following observation, which Atlantic argues supports its 
position: 
 
       It is sufficient for this case to observe that the Board 
       has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of 
       the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may 
       wholly ignore other and equally important 
       Congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of 
       Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation 
       of one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too 
       much to demand of an administrative body that it 
       undertake this accommodation without excessive 
       emphasis upon its immediate task. 
 
Id. at 47. 
 
Essentially, the issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the labor policy prohibiting an employer from firing 
an employee for striking in response to an unfair labor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Court stated: 
 
       It may hardly be disputed that each of the strikers resisted the 
       captain and other officers in the free and lawful exercise of their 
       authority and command, within the meaning of S 293, or that they 
       combined and conspired to that end, within the meaning of S 292. 
       Deliberately and persistently they defied dir ect commands to 
       perform their duties in making r eady for the departure from port. 
 
Id. at 40. 
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practice can apply, let alone prevail, when the strike is 
illegal under a competing federal scheme. In the case before 
us, by contrast, the issue does not involve a competing 
policy that runs counter to an award of backpay. Unlike in 
Southern Steamship, the policies sought to be advanced 
here are not diametrically opposed to one another. In fact, 
the policies, to the extent they do compete, can be 
accommodated, and in fact have been accommodated her e. 
The Board's basing its finding on the evidence before it, 
consistent with its procedure for fixing and awarding 
backpay, while at the same time notifying the IRS of its 
decision, recognizes the existence and equal importance of 
both policies -- enforcing our nation's tax laws and making 
the discriminatees' whole. If the Board had chosen to award 
the amount stated on the tax returns for the sole reason 
that the discriminatees would have to "reap what they had 
sown," it would have ignored the remedial underpinnings of 
the law, and rewarded Atlantic, the of fending party. 
 
Moreover, we submit that while federal tax policy 
discourages underreporting of income, and favors 
punishing those who do, federal tax policy would appear to 
have no interest in limiting a backpay awar d. In fact, it 
could be said that it has the opposite inter est because once 
Jenkins and Purcell receive an awar d (that is not limited by 
reference to reported income), they will have to pay tax on 
what they receive, paying the federal gover nment more than 
if the award had been limited to their r eported income.4 
 
Here, despite Atlantic's contentions, we conclude that no 
federal policy is relegated to a lesser status. The IRS will 
have the information necessary to prosecute the 
discriminatees if it so chooses, and will reap tax revenue. 
And Atlantic will have to "make whole" two employees 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Backpay awards for violations of the Act would appear to be the type 
of non-tort recovery that is taxable. See Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337 (1995) (holding that settlement 
for backpay in age discrimination case was not excludable from 
taxpayer's reported gross income because"[r]ecovery for back wages does 
not satisfy the critical requirement [of the IRS tax code] of being on 
account of any personal injury," nor is it "based upon tort or tort type 
rights.") 
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against whom it wrongly discriminated, fulfilling the 
purpose of the Act. 
 
Atlantic also relies on Sure-T an, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 
883, 886 (1984), but we do not find this decision 
particularly relevant to the instant situation. There, the 
Board had determined that the employer committed an 
unfair labor practice by requesting that the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service investigate certain employees 
who were involved in a union campaign. Id.  at 888. 
Because some of these employees were undocumented 
aliens, they fled the country to avoid deportation. Id. at 
887. The Board awarded backpay, subject to the employees' 
legal availability to work. Id. at 889. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir cuit 
modified the backpay award by ordering that the aggrieved 
employees be guaranteed a minimum of six months' 
backpay. Id. at 890. The court reasoned that because some 
of the employees may not have been lawfully available for 
employment, without the backpay minimum, they would 
not receive any backpay at all. Id. The Supreme Court 
reversed the backpay modification, stating:"The probable 
unavailability of the Act's more effective remedies in light of 
the practical workings of the immigration laws, however, 
simply cannot justify the judicial arrogation of remedial 
authority not fairly encompassed within the Act." Id. at 
904. The key to the Court's reversal of the modification was 
the Court of Appeals' imposition of a minimum awar d 
"without regard to the employees' actual economic losses or 
legal availability for work . . . . plainly exceed[ing] its limited 
authority under the Act." Id. at 904-05. And, while the 
Board in the instant case surely shar ed the same concern 
as the court of appeals in Sure-T an, that is, providing a 
financial disincentive to the employer against r epetition of 
similar discrimination, id. at 904, her e, unlike in Sure-Tan, 
the award of backpay does reflect the discriminatees' actual 
loss, consistent with the remedial scheme. 
 
Atlantic also maintains that the Board's decision is 
contrary to our precedent. We do not agr ee. We have 
previously upheld an award of backpay when it was based 
on evidence of income in an amount differ ent from that 
declared by the claimant to the IRS. In NLRB v. Louton, Inc., 
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822 F.2d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 1987), we upheld the Board's 
backpay award where the recor d showed substantial 
evidence to support the tip income awarded. 5 In doing so, 
we rejected the employer's argument that the tip income 
evidence was "of no value" since it dif fered from the amount 
the discriminatees had declared to the IRS. Id. 
 
Moreover, while we note Atlantic's ar gument that 
awarding backpay based on unreported tips rewards the 
discriminatees for their dishonesty to the IRS, Atlantic fails 
to recognize that we would be rewar ding the employers' tax 
dishonesty if we were to disregard evidence of the 
employees' actual, more substantial reportable income. 
That is, if we rely on reported income that concededly did 
not accurately reflect the employee's ear nings, we would 
actually be rewarding employers who, as noted by the ALJ,6 
have benefitted from paying a lesser amount of 
employment-related taxes as a result of the underreporting. 
This benefit is in addition to the benefit that Atlantic would 
reap, in contravention of backpay policy, by having to pay 
aggrieved employees less in backpay than they actually 
would have earned. 
 
Lastly, Atlantic contends that if we reject its proposed 
rule that we should disregard evidence that differs from an 
employee's tax returns, we would be guaranteeing that all 
discriminatees seeking backpay will lie about their 
earnings. However, Atlantic ignor es the fact that this 
deception will probably be quite costly in other ways. By 
testifying that they had underreported their income to the 
IRS, Purcell and Jenkins subjected themselves to 
prosecution for tax evasion. Therefor e, any incentive that 
they might have to lie to inflate their income is countered 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We acknowledge that, as we discuss below, the discriminatees 
provided more documentary support in Louton than in the instant case, 
and we note that it is unclear whether the employer's argument in that 
case was based on policy considerations. However , the distinction is 
immaterial, where, as here, we have nonetheless determined that the 
discriminatees' credible testimony (and supporting document) are 
sufficient to meet the "substantial evidence" standard. 
 
6. "[T]he lower the reported earnings [of an employee are], the lower the 
employer's payroll tax liability [is]." ALJ Dec. at 4. 
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by the fear, and very real possibility, of criminal charges. 
We noted this in Louton, when we found that the employees' 
claims were actually strengthened by the fact that they had 
maintained the veracity of their tip claims in the face of 
potential prosecution for tax evasion or perjury. 822 F.2d at 
414. 
 
Accordingly, we reject Atlantic's contention that the 
evidence regarding the discriminatees' unr eported tips in 
the Board's backpay award should be disr egarded because 
it undermines federal tax policy. 
 
B. Substantial Evidence Determination  
 
As noted above, the Board's findings of fact in a backpay 
proceeding will be upheld unless the recor d, considered as 
a whole, shows no substantial evidence to support those 
findings. 88 Transit, 55 F.3d at 825. Substantial evidence 
has been defined as evidence that a reasonable mind would 
accept as adequate to support an agency's conclusion. 
Broome v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 870 F .2d 95, 102 (3d Cir. 
1989). We will not disturb a backpay or der "unless it can be 
shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends 
other than those which can be fairly said to ef fectuate the 
policies of the Act." 88 Transit, 55 F.3d at 825. 
 
In Louton, we held that "the recor d, when considered as 
a whole, shows substantial evidence to support the Board's 
findings." 822 F.2d at 414. In that case, the Board's 
decision was based on documented tip evidence of the 
discriminatees, the ALJ's determination that the 
discriminatees were credible, the fact that the 
discriminatees' testimony was bolstered by their facing 
prosecution for perjury or tax evasion due to their 
admission that they had underreported their tips to the 
IRS, and the employer's failure to submit gr oss receipts in 
order to demonstrate that the tips being claimed were 
reasonable. Id. 
 
In the instant case, the discriminatees' claims wer e 
proven, for the most part, through their own testimony, and 
accordingly, the outcome was affected by their credibility. 
In Louton, we stressed the importance of the ALJ's reliance 
on the demeanor of the discriminatees during their 
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testimony regarding their tip income, noting that where 
credibility determinations are based on the ALJ's 
assessment of demeanor, those determinations are entitled 
to great deference as long as relevant factors are considered 
and resolutions explained. Id.; see also NLRB v. Lee Hotel 
Corp., 13 F.3d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir . 1994) (enforcing 
Board's order basing backpay award on amount of tip 
income which differed from amount r eported on income tax 
returns where ALJ found employees' testimony credible 
based on both corroborative evidence and potential 
ramifications of the discriminatees' testimony). In the 
instant case, while the documentary evidence was not 
comparable to the submissions in Louton, the ALJ credited 
the discriminatees' testimony, harkening back to our stated 
view in Louton regarding the importance of credibility and 
the deference we should afford the ALJ's determinations in 
the absence of any evidence indicating otherwise. 822 F.2d 
at 414; Lee Hotel, 13 F.3d at 1351 ("The ALJ's credibility 
determinations should not be reversed unless inherently 
incredible or patently unreasonable"). 
 
In addition, Jenkins presented the original copy of the 
time sheet he had submitted for the week of May 19, 1993, 
which indicated he had made $430 in cash tips that week. 
He acknowledged that the carbon copy of that time sheet, 
which was submitted to Atlantic, did not reflect any cash 
tips. Thus, he asserted that this document corr oborates his 
testimony that he would leave the space for cash tips blank 
on the copy of the time sheet he gave to his employer, while 
keeping another for himself where he recor ded his tips. 
This document is the only written proof of the unreported 
tips earned. As we have noted, the ALJ concluded that 
while the evidence was not "overwhelming," the Board had 
"established a sound and reasonable basis for the figures 
set forth in the compliance specification . . . ." and he was 
not persuaded that the figures were"unreasonable or 
inaccurate." ALJ Dec. at 4. 
 
In a backpay proceeding, once the Board's General 
Counsel demonstrates the gross amount of backpay that 
the claimant is due, the burden shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate that no backpay is due or that the amount 
due had been improperly determined. 88 Transit Lines, 55 
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F.3d at 827; Angle v. NLRB, 683 F .2d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 
1982); NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 
Local 1913, 531 F.2d 424, 426 (9th Cir . 1976). If there is 
substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that 
Atlantic has not met its burden "to establish facts which 
would negative the existence of liability . . . . or which 
would mitigate that liability," we must uphold the Board's 
conclusion. 88 Transit Lines, 55 F .3d at 827; see also 
Angle, 683 F.2d at 1302 (granting the Board's order for 
enforcement where employer did not pr esent necessary 
"sufficient credible evidence" to support assertions that 
Board's calculations were wrong); Carpenters, 531 F.2d at 
426 (upholding Board's conclusion where employer had 
"not met its burden of negativing the General Counsel's 
findings"). 
 
Atlantic submitted evidence that it contends was pr oof of 
the discriminatees' income. It relied on the tax return 
evidence, which, as we have mentioned, could be said to 
cut both ways. Even though the tax retur ns contradict the 
discriminatees' claims, the fact that their swor n testimony 
that they underreported their income exposed them to tax 
evasion and perjury charges actually bolsters their 
credibility. Louton, 822 F.2d at 414. Aside from its assertion 
that disregarding tax evidence under mines an important 
congressional policy, which we have rejected, Atlantic 
presented no basis for concluding that the employees' tax 
returns, rather than their testimony, r eflected the actual 
amount of their income. Atlantic also submitted the weekly 
signed tip declarations, urging that these for ms were the 
employees' "oaths" that they had declar ed all the cash tips 
they had earned, and that they should have to stand by 
what they declared. However, the evidence in this regard 
was conflicting. Jenkins testified that David Geiger, one of 
Atlantic's owners, had actually instructed him not to enter 
his cash tips on the carbon copy of the time sheet that he 
submitted. Jenkins stated that the time sheet was even 
returned to him once when he mistakenly wrote his cash 
tips on that form. Further, Leon Geiger testified, and 
Atlantic does not dispute, that most workers did not write 
in any cash tips on their time sheets. It seems obvious that 
Atlantic was aware that most employees wer e earning, but 
simply not declaring, their cash tips. Hence, we do not take 
 
                                14 
  
issue with the ALJ's finding that Atlantic's position that the 
time sheets actually reflected total tips was nothing more 
than a "fiction." ALJ Dec. at 3. 
 
Atlantic also attacks the quality of the evidence that 
Jenkins and Purcell have produced to support their claims 
of tips earned, contending that they lack corr oboration. 
However, we do not regard that as dispositive. Rather, we 
deem it fairly common for employees not to keep r ecords of 
the tips they earn. Further, as a practical matter, it would 
probably be difficult for Purcell and Jenkins to bring 
forward witnesses to corroborate their actual tip income 
and earnings, given the fact that if their co-workers testified 
that they too had declared lower cash tips than what they 
actually had earned and reported, they would be subjecting 
themselves to prosecution for tax fraud. And, the issue 
before us under the substantial evidence standard is 
whether a reasonable mind would accept the evidence as 
adequate, not whether it could have been bolster ed through 
corroboration or additional testimony. 
 
Atlantic complains that there really is no defense an 
employer can present to overcome the discriminatees' 
assertions, but we disagree. Atlantic could have leveled 
further attacks on the employees' credibility, kept the type 
of records that would have rebutted these types of claims, 
or produced witnesses to attack the claimants' stories. 
Atlantic did not submit other evidence which would tend to 
disprove the discriminatees' claims. As in Louton, where we 
noted the company's failure to produce gr oss receipts which 
would have allowed the ALJ to ascertain whether the tips 
asserted by the discriminatees were reasonable, 822 F.2d at 
414, here, Atlantic did not introduce r eceipts of total sales 
from which we could glean how much the drivers should 
have earned in tips. Atlantic's urging that the 
discriminatees should be foreclosed based on their tax 
returns and purported tip declarations does not convince 
us that the Board's decision lacks substantial evidentiary 
support. 
 
Atlantic's attacks on the employees' proof, and its 
excuses for lack of evidence, cannot distract us fr om the 
fact that the burden of proof is on the employer, as the 
wrongdoer, to establish facts to dispute the claim of the 
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aggrieved employee. NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 
447, 454 (8th Cir. 1963). Once Jenkins and Purcell had 
presented their case, the onus for the pr oduction of 
witnesses was not on the claimant, but rather , on Atlantic. 
In Hacienda Hotel and Casino v. Willow Bowe , 279 N.L.R.B. 
601, 602 (1986), the ALJ had the benefit of the testimony 
of the discriminatee's co-workers, and yet these witnesses 
were produced not by the discriminatee, but by her 
employer, who submitted the conflicting testimony in an 
effort to at least limit the discriminatee's backpay to the 
lesser amount testified to by the plaintiff 's fellow waitresses.7 
Id. at 604. Here, Atlantic did not pr oduce similar testimony, 
and, as we have explained, the evidence it did intr oduce 
was not really persuasive on the issue. 
 
The Board's dissent also questioned the ALJ's 
calculations because both the ALJ's award and the 
compliance specification concluded that backpay should be 
in an amount that differed from both what Atlantic alleged 
the discriminatees earned, and what the discriminatees 
themselves claimed to have earned. Yet, as observed by the 
Board, the tip amounts for Jenkins and Pur cell used in the 
compliance specification and adopted by the ALJ ar e only 
approximations that "fall within the middle range of the tip 
income claimed by the discriminatees in their testimony." 
Supp. Dec. at 2. This methodology, while a bit impr ecise, 
does not render the award invalid. See Buncher v. NLRB, 
405 F.2d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (stating that 
Board seeks only "approximation" of backpay owed and 
thus specification was not objectionable on gr ound of 
inconsistencies with work histories of some employees). 
Also, in Hacienda Hotel, 279 N.L.R.B. at 605, when 
quantifying the amount of backpay, the Board attempted to 
resolve significant testimonial conflict over the amount of 
tips cocktail waitresses received, and arrived at a 
reasonable approximation based on the evidence before it. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that while conflicting testimony lends support to an 
employer's assertion that an employee is lying about the amount of tips 
earned, this type of evidence is also not dispositive. In Hacienda Hotel, 
the Board upheld the backpay award even though it exceeded both the 
discriminatee's tax returns and the amounts testified to by the other 
witnesses. 
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In doing so, the Board noted that "exactitude is not 
possible . . . ." Id. We agr ee that such approximations are 
not improper. 
 
We therefore find that, viewing the record as a whole, the 
Board's order of backpay was supported by substantial 
evidence. 
 
C. Substantial Evidence of Mitigated Damages  
 
Atlantic also contends that by failing to make r easonable 
efforts to obtain interim employment, Jenkins did not 
mitigate his damages and Atlantic is, therefor e, not 
obligated to pay Jenkins back wages. See Tubari , 959 F.2d 
at 454 (holding that where employee has not exercised 
reasonable diligence in efforts to secur e employment, 
employer has established that employee did not pr operly 
mitigate damages). Once the amount of backpay has been 
established, the burden to produce evidence of a failure to 
mitigate is on the employer. Id. at 453. This burden is 
heavy: "A discharged worker is not held to the highest 
standard of diligence in his or her efforts to secure 
comparable employment; reasonable exertions ar e 
sufficient." NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Serv., 589 
F.2d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 1979); see also NLRB v. Westin 
Hotel, 758 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir . 1985) ("[A] wrongfully- 
discharged employee is only requir ed to make a reasonable 
effort to mitigate damages, and is not held to the highest 
standard of diligence"); Fabi Fashions, Inc. v. Local 107, 291 
N.L.R.B. 586, 587 (1988) ("[I]n seeking to mitigate loss of 
income a backpay claimant is held . . . only to`reasonable 
exertions in this regard, not the highest standard of 
diligence' . . . . The principle of mitigation of damages does 
not require success, it only requir es an honest good faith 
effort . . . .") (quoting NLRB v. Ar duini Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 
420, 423 (1st Cir. 1968)). Once again, we r eview the factual 
determination of the Board regar ding Jenkins' due diligence 
in seeking interim employment under the standar d of 
substantial evidence. Westin Hotel, 758 F.2d at 1130. 
 
We find that Jenkins' testimony supports the Board's 
determination that his search for employment was not 
unreasonable. Jenkins did testify that during the seven 
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month period in question, he was caring for his mother, 
who was ill. Atlantic argues that this r esponsibility made 
him unavailable for work. However, Jenkins testified on 
redirect examination that during the entir e seven months, 
he continued to seek employment in a variety of ways. 
Jenkins also noted that he was still caring for his mother 
when he did find a position, which supports his ar gument 
that would have accepted full-time work throughout the 
seven month period in question. Based on his testimony as 
a whole, we agree with the Board that ther e is substantial 
evidence that Atlantic has not met its burden of 
establishing that Jenkins' lack of interim ear nings was 
indicative of an unreasonable search for employment, and 
therefore, we find that Atlantic has not established the 
affirmative defense of failure to mitigate his damages. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will deny the Petition for 
Review of the Order of the National Labor Relations Board 
and grant the Cross-Application for Enfor cement of the 
Order of the National Labor Relations Boar d. 
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